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INTRODUCTION
This article aims to depict the general 
picture of Pattani Central Mosque in terms 
of its profile, Islamic teaching practices, and 
its management. In other words, this study is 
important to carefully look at another function of 
the place for worship in which case is not only for 
religious activities but could also be activated as 
a sanctuary from the unjust violence. Compared 
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ABSTRAK
Berbicara secara umum, masjid-masjid dan pondok-pondok pesantren di Thailand Selatan dipandang sebagai 
tempat melahirkan militan Muslim Thailand. Secara khusus, di wilayah Pattani kebanyakan masjid diasumsikan 
sebagai tempat merekrut militan Muslim guna melawan Pemerintah Thailand. Dalam hal ini, insiden Masjid Kru-
Ze 2004 telah menumbuhkan Muslim militan untuk melawan pemerintah Thailand. Dalam hal ini, saya percaya 
bahwa Masjid Central Pattani  di Thailand Selatan memiliki elemen-elemen non-kekerasan yang bisa diaktivasi 
sebagai tempat untuk mencegah kekerasan yang tidak adil. Oleh karena itu, artikel ini akan menilai kualitas 
nyata dari Masjid Raya Pattani di Thailand Selatan dengan dasar profil deskriptif dari masjid tersebut. Dengan 
demikian, pembaca akan mendapatkan gambaran yang lebih utuh tentang permasalahan tersebut. Selanjutnya, 
dengan menganalisa praktik-praktik keagamaan di masjid tersebut, penulis berkesimpulan bahwa Masjid Raya 
Pattani nampak sebagai campuran yang setara antara Muslim moderat dengan jemaah yang lebih  konservatif 
daripada radikal dan ekstrem.
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ABSTRACT
Generally speaking, mosques and pondok (Islamic boarding schools) in Southern Thailand are regarded as place 
for fostering Muslim militants. In Pattani, many mosques are taken for granted as places to recruit Muslim militants 
against the Thai Government. For instance, Kru-Ze Mosque incident in 2004 had raised various militant, Islamist 
activities against the central government. In this regard, I believe that Pattani Central Mosque has non-violence 
elements that could be activated as a sanctuary to hinder the unjust violence. Therefore, this article will examine 
the real quality of Pattani Central Mosque in southern Thailand on the basis of its profile. Consequently, readers 
would grasp a general picture about those matters. Thus, by analyzing the religious practices within the mosque, 
I conclude that Pattani Central Mosque seems to be composed of a fairly equal mixture of moderate and more 
conservative Muslims instead of those with radical and extreme tendencies.
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with the Indonesian context, this paper gives a 
general portray about the dynamics of religious 
practices and the mosque management with the 
latent conflict between the Southern Thai Muslims 
against the Thailand central government.  This 
article describes the profile of Pattani Central 
Mosque and discussanalyze the research findings 
viz., this mosque represents both the moderate 
and conservative believers rather than the radical 
ones.  
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A BRIEF PROFILE OF MASJID JAMI’ 
PATTANI (PATTANI CENTRAL 
MOSQUE)
Entering the Pattani land from Hat Yai 
airport, people can easily read the name of Masjid 
Jami’ Pattani in the advertisement on the street. 
Another popular mosque is the Kru-ze Mosque. 
Both mosques are well-known, not only to the 
Thai people but also to foreign people such 
as Malaysians and Indonesians. In addition, 
a number of tourism websites have put both 
mosques as the tourist destinations. 
In 1964 Masjid Jami’ is built and located 
in Yarang, the Pattani Municipality. According 
to an informant, there was a rumor behind the 
establishment of the mosque. It is said that the 
King of Thailand wanted to do a good deed for 
the Pattani people by building a mosque as a 
compensation because there was a mass murder 
at that time, and as a consequence, there were 
discontent of Muslim people. 
If this is the case, those who know the story 
are reluctant to pray in the mosque because the 
idea of developing the mosque is not fully sincere. 
In addition, before the King ordered to establish 
the mosque, he and his companions spent a month 
in India to study the architectures of existing 
buildings there to choose the most suitable style 
for the mosque in Pattani.     
According to my informant, it was merely 
a small masjid that is used only for praying at 
first. Then, it is enlarged until its current form 
gradually, and it took nine years to complete its 
construction. The mosque thus is not dedicated 
only to prayer but also to other activities. To 
date, its surrounding are business places such as 
a travel agent, a furniture store, banks, etc. There 
is also a second hand market nearby the mosque. 
Its strategic location makes the mosque is easily 
reached by a car, a motorbike and on foot.
Basically, the mosque’s architecture adopted 
Taj Mahal in India. There is a big dome in the 
center which is surrounded by four small minarets. 
A big pond is located in front of the mosque, and 
there is a large hall and two sided corridors inside 
the mosque. Small trees and various beautiful 
flowers make the mosque appear beautifully 
and bring peaceful tranquility either for the 
congregations or tourists especially in summer 
Hence, there is no exaggeration to claim that this 
is one of the most beautiful and largest mosques 
in Thailand. 
There are three entrances in the mosque. 
The main entrance is in the middle, and it leads 
directly to the pond. The second entrance leads 
to the parking area and the last one is located 
behind the mosque. This entrance is rarely used 
by tourists, and only a small number of Muslims 
come and go through this way.
This mosque is the most important center 
for Islamic religious activities in the Southern 
Thailand. In addition, the mosque has many 
activities, ranged from five prayers in a day and 
tadika (a kindergarten) to organizing various 
rallies against the Thai government.
ISLAMIC TEACHING PRACTICES
Generally speaking, Islamic teaching 
practices in this mosque follow the tradition of 
Shafi’i school of Sunni tradition. It is obviously 
reflected in the practice of the five day prayers 
(rawatib), such as reciting zikir after praying, 
reading qunut in the shubuh praying, the two 
consecutive calls to prayers (azan), the practice 
of raising a stick during Friday prayers, reading 
Yasin verses collectively, reading Barazanji in the 
celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad 
PBUH, etc. These Shafi’i traditions are found in 
the mosque. A similar Islamic practices could be 
found in many other mosques in Pattani as well 
as many mosques in Indonesia due to the fact that 
the majority of Muslims are Shafi’i followers.
Fortunately, there are no hints of Islamist 
neo-fundamentalism in the mosque. Furthermore, 
the mosque does not unify some fragmentations 
within the diverse Islamic group in Pattani region, 
but it finally represents itself as the fortress of 
khana kao. In this regard, khana kao means 
Muslim’s conservative groups, that represent old 
generations.
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THE RELUCTANCE OF OTHER 
ISLAMIC GROUP TOWARD THE 
EXISTENCE OF THE MOSQUE
There are no clues provided in the mosque, 
through its Islamic teaching practices, promulgates 
ideas on struggling for the Islamist main goal 
such as the idea of forming an Islamic state or, 
at least, teaching about the application of Shari’a 
on the state level. In addition, there is no striking 
evidence of Salafy-Wahaby followers, as part 
of dakwah movement in Pattani, who practice 
religious activities, here. Although there are few 
constituents of Jemaah Tabligh who pray five 
times a day in this mosque, their presence here is 
no more than some individuals who practice its 
tenets rather than an organized movement. 
This argument is supported by the informant 
perceptions and my own observations. I did 
not observe any of them attending this mosque. 
My informant told me that followers of Salafy-
Wahaby prefer to pray in their own mosque, not 
in this mosque. To some extent, they do pray in 
the mosque of the Prince of Songkla University, 
Pattani Campus. 
The reluctance of these groups could be 
considered as the religious tension among the 
mosque stakeholders (khana kao), Jemaah 
Tabligh, and Salafy-Wahaby followers (khana 
mai). Here, this study uses a sociological, 
theoretical framework that is Weber’s and 
Troeltsch’s conception of tension (cited in Bagby 
2009). Basically, the concept is related to the 
Catholic tradition, that is, a tension between a 
‘sect’ and a ‘church’. The concept explains a type 
of religious dominant group that maintain and 
sometime accommodate the social cultural norms 
of the society. But, at the same time there is another 
religious group challenges the existing norms.
The congregation of the mosque could 
be put as the religious dominant group (khana 
kao) in Pattani region. Meanwhile, the Salafy-
Wahaby and the Tabligh could be considered as 
the khana mai (the new school) some of which 
challenging the religious practices of the mosque 
that are presumably against the pristine Islam. 
Consequently, their rejection to attend prays in 
the mosque implies the development of some new 
mosques, and eventually have made a polarization 
among various Muslim communities in Pattani. 
The phenomenon is portrayed (McCargo, 2008) 
as tensions and competitions between the ’new 
school’ (khana mai) and the ’old school’ (khana 
kao) in taking place in some mosques in Pattani 
region. 
Furthermore, Stark and Bainbridge (cited in 
Bagby 2009) discuss that ‘Church-set typology 
as a continuum, and the operational variable is 
the degree of tension between the religious group 
and the dominant culture—i.e. tension caused by 
acceptance or rejection on the part of both entities’. 
In the case of Pattani mosques, tensions occurred 
due to the rejection of some Islamic teaching 
practices from different Islamic groups. 
Beside both groups,  there are a few Muslims 
that not related to the both groups do not pray in 
the mosque as well due to two main reasons: firstly, 
they believe that non-Muslims should not enter the 
mosque whatever the reasons are; secondly, they 
have seen the mosque is dominated by symbols of 
the Thai monarchy because it is built and funded 
by the King.  
PREACHERS AS AFFIRMATION OF 
TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY
From a theoretical perspective, Gaffney 
(1994, 194-250) categorized three types of 
preachers according to its sermons in Egypt 
mosques: firstly, preachers as the affirmation of 
traditional authority; secondly, preachers as the 
advocate of religiously inspired modernity; and 
thirdly, preachers of apologist for the ideology of 
Islamic fundamentalism.
To put it simply, the first character emphasizes 
preaching that mostly talks about religious matters. 
As Gaffney (1994, 194) mentioned that:
 “The central theme of the sermon, including 
the main Qur’an verse which it is built, is 
quite familiar; in fact the verse is among the 
commonplace of citations in all of contemporary 
Muslim religious rhetoric...In short the sermon in 
the first category reflects the classical standard.” 
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The second character, according to Gaffney 
(1994, 208), reflects ‘a considerable measure of 
innovation and adaptation. Hence, the preaching, 
combined with other ritual expression, offers 
elements that tend to be less predicable, seemingly 
experimental, and sometimes idiosyncratic’. The 
kind of preaching that is aimed ‘to carry Islam 
from the pulpit to the streets’ allow a greater 
flexibility and a more dialectical interaction with 
the everyday occurrence of the world outside the 
mosque. The third character asserts the ‘preacher 
who legitimates his function by assuming the 
culturally constituted duty of “struggle” or jihad’ 
(Gaffney, 1994, 238).  
I argue that the majority of Pattani Central 
mosques preachers could be categorized as the 
affirmations of traditional authority. The reason 
lies in the content of their khutbahs many of 
which discussing the religious matters. In practice, 
preachers here recite common verses from Qur’an 
that can be easily found in many mosques in the 
Muslim world. Their khutbahs do not venture 
beyond these verses.
In practice, no preachers have talked outside 
this perimeter. I saw that they are reluctant to go 
beyond the religious matters because the mosque 
does not allow preachers to talk about ikhtilaf 
(deviation/differences) and armed jihad, etc. To 
sum up, no preachers in this mosque could be 
put into either the second or the third types of 
Gaffney’s classification.  
As a central mosque in conflict situation, the 
emergence of preachers who campaign for peace, 
good governance and values such as pluralism 
and multiculturalism is required to maintain 
the mindset of congregation to internalize, to 
adopt and to act in accordance with those values. 
However, it is unlikely we could find preachers 
stemming from the threat of militant groups. At 
the same time, if they talk about jihad or criticize 
the Thai government or monarchy, they would 
face the cruelty of State officials. Interestingly, 
my informant told me that generally uztad share 
similar concerns with militants, for example, in 
terms of grievances. The difference lies in the 
militants who follow the violence path while 
most uztads are silent in responding to situations. 
In short, many uztad who preach in the mosque 
strive to avoid sensitive issues.    To conclude, most 
preachers in the mosque could be categorized as 
the second type of Gaffney’s category. 
THE ABSENCE OF LITERATURE 
THAT SUPPORT VIOLENT JIHAD
The other important clue that this mosque 
is not infiltrated by radicalism is the absence 
of literature that support the violent jihad. This 
study presume that many mosques in Pattani 
do not provide literatures with which justifying 
the violent jihad. Once, I performed my Jum’at 
prayers at a mosque in Bangkok in 2012. Soon 
after, the mosque officials distributed a leaflet 
about Muslim massacres or genocide in Syria 
while at the same time calling Muslims to help 
their Muslim brothers and sisters in Syria through 
donations of money, and via a jihad against the 
Assad administration.  
There was no clue as to whom the authors 
of this leaflet are, or whether it was the work of an 
individual or a group. In the light of this particular 
event, leaflets and bulletins that support jihad may 
have developed in such a way in many mosques 
in Thailand. In this regard, further research about 
this is needed. It is important to note that in the 
case of Kru-ze Mosque there was a booklet that 
justifying the violent jihad which is found on the 
body of victim. Its title is Berjihad di Patani, as 
described in the previous chapter.
The phenomenon of literature that supporting 
the violent jihad could be found in both American 
and Indonesia mosques. Kedar and Yerushalmi 
(2009) claim there are a number of American 
mosques providing literature that endorsing the 
violent jihad. Indeed, some invited preachers 
promulgate and encourage the violent jihad in 
their preaching. 
In Indonesia, many mosques and office's 
mosques (mosques be attached to offices) provide 
|  105Ridwan | Examining The Pattani Central Mosque Amid The Southern Thailand Conflict 
literatures containing contents some of which 
calling for the violent jihad in the forms of leaflets 
and bulletins. Such literatures could easily be 
found there especially in relation to calamities 
in some countries such as Palestine, Bosnia and 
Afghanistan many of which Muslims are the 
victims. Apart from these literature, it does not 
include bulletins from Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 
(HTI), to wit Al-Islam, by which it could easily 
be found in every mosque every Friday pray. In 
this light, Fealy (2004, 105-106) argues that HTI 
is one of the radical Islamist groups. 
To date, the Al-Islam of HTI bulletin has 
been seen as an alternative critique against 
injustices of the Indonesian governmental system. 
In general, the idea of global Islamic caliphate for 
majority of Muslims in Indonesia seems peculiar 
due to who should be the legitimate caliph. In 
addition, some moderate Islam groups, such as 
NU and Muhammadiyah, are worried with the 
penetration of Caliphate ideas toward the ummah. 
Furthermore, it seems that more students in 
Indonesia or abroad, some of which in Australia, 
become sympathizers of HTI. I know it whenever 
I was studying in Sydney, Australia, for my 
MHRD in 2011. For instance, in the mailing 
list of the Indonesian students in the University 
of Sydney, I often received various propaganda 
concerning HTI’s ideology, including its electronic 
bulletin, Al-Islam. In addition, I also met some 
HTI sympathizers during an Indonesian student 
conference in the Indonesian Consulate in Sydney. 
Questioning Mosque Management: Some 
Observations
Generally speaking, the mosque management 
in Pattani has functioned well in running religious 
activities. The Imam gives opportunities to all 
Muslims to conduct religious activities regardless 
their own affiliations to one of which four Islamic 
schools (mazhab). Furthermore, the management 
team has applied the idea of shura in determining 
policies that are related to mosque matters. 
Additionally, they practice transparency in using 
funds related to mosque expenses as well. 
Mosque management in the Pattani central 
mosque, to some extent, shares some similarities 
with the mosque management team in Indonesia. 
The management in Indonesia is called Dewan 
Kemakmuran Masjid (DKM/the mosque prosperity 
council). Its operation is based on a policy that 
is enacted by the Indonesian government (Al-
Makassary, 2011, 288). 
In DKM, there are three divisions which 
serve as indicators to examine the effectiveness 
of a mosque. Firstly, the division of organization 
(idaroh). Secondly, the division of welfare 
(imaroh). Thirdly, the division of maintenance 
and development (ria’yah). Moreover, idaroh 
does some planning, organizing, administering, 
financing and supervising all activities within 
the Indonesian mosques. Meanwhile, imaroh 
serves the education activities, be the center of 
dakwah (proselytization), improving the welfare 
of ummah, youths, library, etc. The services of 
ri’ayah includes architectures and the design of 
a mosque, maintaining facilities, park and the 
environment. 
Regardless the operation management of 
this mosque, I have some suggestions that are 
important to be considered in managing mosques 
everywhere.
The Involvement in Civic Engagements 
It seems that civic engagements, such 
as empowering the community, cleaning up 
the environment, and peace initiatives, are not 
sufficiently noticed by this mosque It functions no 
more than a place for praying and other religious 
activities. Therefore, the mosque management 
should enlarge their functions beyond serving as 
a place of prayer and devotion.
In comparison, according to McLoughlin 
(2005, 1408), some mosques in Britain have 
functioned as places of prayer, devotion, and 
serving as ‘advice centers for the unemployed, 
Members of Parliament’s surgeries, homework 
clubs, youth centers, elderly day-care centers, and 
spaces to prepare food for communal gatherings 
such as weddings’ since the 1980s. 
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In a similar way, Bagby (2009,  481) claims 
that the political and community involvement 
is manifest in American mosques. Furthermore, 
he adds that The Mosque Life Survey (MLS) 
found that 20 percent of participants took part in 
‘community service, social justice or advocacy 
activities of their mosque’. 
Another example is a mosque in Sierra 
Leone. Drewer (2010, 57) argues that a primary 
key of conflict resolution or peacekeeping is to 
maintain houses of God, namely via churches and 
mosques through the Inter-religious Council of 
Sierra Leone. At this point, I regard that mosques 
could play a pivotal role in the civic engagements 
in their congregations.
The Influence of Salafy- and Wahaby-based 
Donor 
As showed above, The Pattani Central 
Mosque could be categorized as a khana kao home 
base by carefully examining its Islamic teaching 
practices. I presume that many mosques in Pattani 
belong to the khana kao.  However, the recent 
trend shows that several new mosques are built by 
the generosity of Salafy and Wahaby-based funds 
from Saudi Arabia. 
McCargo (2008) discusses the tensions 
between ‘new school’ (khana mai) and ’old school’ 
(khana kao) that taking place in some Pattani 
mosques due to a different approach in Islam. 
Basically, the ‘new school’ are alumni from abroad 
universities and follow progressive interpretation 
about Islamic teaching that differ from the old 
school that represent conservative group.
The extent to which some mosques in Pattani 
have been infiltrated by Salafy and Wahaby-based 
funds require further investigations because 
a probable mission behind of the funds is the 
promotion of Wahabysm. 
It is not surprising that Saudi Arabia is 
striving to promulgate Wahabysm in the Muslim 
world. Wahid (2009) reveals that the Wahaby 
movements in Indonesia strives to promulgate 
their ideas through Islamic institutions and 
organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdhatul 
Ulama (NU), Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), 
and the education and government institutions 
and mosques.
Recently, the Islamic radical movement 
has implanted its ideology in mosques that are 
commonly under the auspices of the two biggest 
Islamic organisations viz., Nahdhatul Ulama 
(NU) and Muhammadiyah. In this light, the 
former general chairman of NU, Hasyim Muzadi, 
has warned all Muslim communities to be fully 
vigilant in regard to the emergence of what has 
been called the transnational ideology. To him, 
such an ideology is at odds with the Indonesian 
mainstream Islam which has been renowned for 
its tolerant and moderate character. Hence, this 
ideology must be rejected (Muzadi, 2009).
Moreover, the Central Committee of NU 
thinks it is necessary to protect NU’s mosques 
from the infiltration of radical movement. In 
October 2007, at Pondok Pesantren Zainul 
Hasan Genggong (an Islamic boarding school), 
Probolinggo, Jawa Timur, the NU central 
committee held a Bahtsul Masa’il (a discussion 
on contemporary issues) which issued an edict on 
the certification of NU’s mosques in order to keep 
them away from the influence of and the probable 
takeover done by this movement. Similarly, the 
Central Chair of Muhammadiyah issued the 
decree No.149/December 2006 that aims to protect 
Muhammadiyah’s properties, such as mosques, 
schools, orphanages, hospitals, and universities 
from the influence and takeover by such radical 
group whose world-view is very much different 
from Muhammadiyah.
America faces a similar situation of 
which Wahabysm is promoted through financial 
assistance. As Keller (cited in Haddad, 1994,  144) 
explains how a mosque could be easily influenced 
by the donors’ ideology. For instance, a mosque in 
Los Angeles had received funds from a company 
or some individuals from Saudi Arabia. This could 
either directly or indirectly influence a mosque 
status and its congregation.
In southern Thailand, Salafy-Wahaby or 
khana mai has been largely commanded by a 
Salafist-Wahabist scholar named Dr. Ismail Lutfi 
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Chapakia. He has institutions such as the Yala 
Islamic College and the College of Islamic Studies 
at Prince of Songkla University.   
Although previous research (Liow, 2006, 
47-48; Yusuf, 2007, 18) considers Dr. Lutfi and his 
followers as the moderate Wahaby, and do not have 
relationships with other militant groups, I guess 
other radical Salafy-Wahaby movements strive to 
nurture influence, and promulgate ideas secretly 
through their financial assistance to mosques and 
pondok (Islamic boarding schools). Yet, Liow 
recognizes that the orthodox Wahaby is still a small 
and periphery group in southern Thailand.
The Weak Control toward Religious Study 
Groups
To date, the Pattani Central mosque has a 
good management in running their own religious 
study groups. Preachers of these study groups 
are uztads who have moderate views, such as 
Uztad Ismail Sepanjang. Theoretically speaking, 
mosques with a weak management could be easily 
infiltrated by the radical Islamic ideas. I think the 
weak control of religious study groups pave the 
way to radical preachers in promoting the radical 
Islamist concepts. This situation, in fact, allows 
the infiltration of radical ideas which occurs in 
mosques. 
The history of Dani Dwi Permana, who 
became a suicide bomber at the JW Marriot 
Hotel, provides a valuable lesson. Dani was a 
religious study group member recruited by Uztad 
Saefuddin Jaelani at the As-Surur mosque in the 
Telaga Kahuripan housing in Bogor, Jawa Barat, 
Indonesia. Furthermore, a mosque study group 
could potentially transform into an ‘incubator of 
Jihadism’ to some extent (Ward, 2008, 216). 
In the light of above, I argue that to some 
extent Kru-ze Mosque tragedy on 28 April 2004 
is caused by the weak control over the religious 
study group in Pattani. 
The Yawi Language as Social Resistance 
During my fieldwork, one of my first 
encounters concerning Malay Pattani is, on the 
one hand, the Pattani language. On the other 
hand, Pattani food, especially nasi kerapu suits 
my taste. Concerning the language, Pattani people 
could speak with others by using Bahasa Indonesia 
though we cannot fully grasp every single 
word. Yet, they still understand the substance 
of conversation. In contrast to such thing, I was 
surprised by the fact that preacher, delivered his 
sermon in the standard Malay so that I understood 
the sermons perfectly. 
I asked myself then why do the preachers 
address their sermons in the ‘standard Malay’ 
while in the daily life, including my interviews, 
the Mosque congregation speaks with a dialect 
of Pattani language. Could the congregation then 
comprehend the sermons delivered in the standard 
Malay? 
Several explanations pop up in my mind. 
Firstly, the preachers are educated people many of 
which have pursued their studies abroad such as in 
various pondoks and universities in Indonesia and 
Malaysia. In other words, they might want to show 
their own educational level. That explains some 
suspicions toward all Indonesians or Malaysians 
especially those from traditional pondok and 
certain Islamic universities in Java Island, 
Indonesia. Secondly, I think the sermons could 
not be fully understood by the Thai intelligence 
operatives especially during the crises in the 
region. Thirdly, that is tradition since the outset, 
and they just keep the tradition. Fourthly, they 
wish to preserve Bahasa Melayu in the midst of 
the domination of Thai language.        
Recently, I know that majority of Pattani 
people, especially the old generation, speak 
Yawi language in a daily life. According to 
Gilquin (2002, 53), Yawi is ‘linked to religion, 
and is traditionally written with characters used 
in Arabic’. This is the difference from other 
languages (Bahasa Malaysia, Bahasa Indonesia 
and the Languages of Mindanao) that use the 
Roman alphabet. 
However, the Arabic character of Yawi 
writing is sharply declining because the Thai 
alphabet is massively taught in the school. This 
phenomenon raised some concerns amongst 
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certain well educated groups in Pattani. Firstly, 
a foundation such as the Bungaraya Foundation 
tries to maintain the existence of Yawi language 
through publishing some books for students. In 
this sense, the foundation manager told me that 
the main idea to publish books in Yawi language 
is to preserve the language in the midst of the Thai 
language supremacy. Secondly, Yawi language 
is more than a mean to communicate among the 
freedom fighters that I have met in a prison in 
southern Thailand. To them, Yawi language is 
the national identity of Pattani. If Pattani loses 
its Yawi language, Pattani will lose its identity as 
well. Similarly, Nilsen (2011,  148) claims that ‘in 
the Patani region, the local Malay dialect indicates 
Muslim identity’.
Based on my observation and interview, 
I think that the Pattani young generation and 
children accustome to speak the Thai language 
than the Malay language. One interesting fact 
that I saw during my fieldwork was the temporary 
tadika that using the Thai language as the 
language of instruction. 
Furthermore, I argue that the rise of 
Thai language is caused by the job and career 
requirements either in Pattani region or in 
Thailand. Therefore, the decline of Malay 
language is inevitably triggered by the lost of 
economic interest on it. Thereby, mastering 
the Malay language means strengthening their 
identity as one Pattani nation, and establishing 
the local Muslim language. 
THE CONTESTING VIEWS TOWARD 
MASJID JAMI’ PATTANI
As a central mosque, Masjid Jami’ Pattani, 
is the center of Islamic activities in Pattani. 
However, the perceptions of Pattani people toward 
this mosque are quite different primarily since 
2004. There are two main views occurred during 
my interviews:
Firstly, most Muslims in Pattani regard this 
mosque as the symbol of Muslim existence in the 
area. Moreover, this mosque plays a pivotal role 
in teaching Islamic community through many 
activities. Secondly, Masjid Jami’ is considered 
as a symbolic power of the Thai Kingdom in 
Pattani. They view this mosque as the King’s 
mosque because it is built and funded by the King. 
It is clearly shown by the Thai flag on the top of 
the mosque, and the presence of representative 
of Thai Monarchy in some occasions such as 
giving prizes for the winners of Qur’an reciting 
competitions. In addition, some people in Pattani 
hold the view that non-Muslims (including the 
King) should not enter a mosque. Practically 
speaking, the mosque manager allows non-
Muslims to enter this mosque, which is regarded 
as a bad thing by these people. Finally, they have 
seen that Masjid Kru-ze turned out to be a brutal, 
slaughtering spot against 106 Muslims on 28 April 
2004. Consequently, the mosque be the symbol 
of the struggle for freedom in Pattani.
CONCLUSION 
Pattani Central Mosque is one entry point 
to look at the dynamic of Islam and conflict in 
southern Thailand through the sociological lens 
and the narrative description of the real inherent 
quality of the mosque (its Islamic teaching 
practices) Many things are available there to 
endorse a view that the mosque plays more 
roles than a mere worshiping place. Thus, it 
zigzags across time ranged from the site for 
some peaceful rallies in 1975 and 2007 by Malay 
Muslim Pattani against the Thai Government; the 
place for resisting the triumph of Thai language 
by exercising the standard Malay language in 
the Friday sermons; until it is regarded as the 
representation of predominant symbol of the Thai 
Kingdom. 
To conclude, a groundless suspicion that the 
mosque is the place to recruit and teach Thailand 
Muslim militants; is not proven on this mosque. 
In addition, the mosque could not represent itself 
as a common house for all Islamic groups due 
to the tensions amongst certain Islamic groups 
that resist the existence of the mosque itself, and 
they prefer to run their own Islamic teaching and 
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developing their views on good governance and 
human rightswithin their own mosques. 
Furthermore, a different depiction and 
qualities of a mosque could probably occur in the 
Pattani sub-urban areas and villages, especially 
mosques with which enjoy financial assistance 
from certain donors such as the Salafy-Wahaby. 
In particular, the radical Islamic ideas, teachings, 
and the practice to recruit young Muslims are not 
proven. Once again I want to emphasize that the 
real quality of the mosque is unique and distinct. 
Hence, it could not be generalized in studying 
other mosques in the Pattani villages.  
All in all, the Pattani Central Mosque 
appears to be composed of a fair, equal mixture of 
moderate and conservative Islamic point of views 
instead of the radical and extreme ones. 
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